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Significance 
 
Neumann, Evett, and Skerrett have made a major contribution to the art and science of finger-
print identification. This is an important—perhaps historic—step forward in the intellectual 
history of fingerprint identification and perhaps other fields of pattern matching forensic sci-
ence. 
Their work deals ingeniously with the elusive problem of placing forensic identification on 
an empirically sound, quantitative foundation. It paves the way for moving forensic identifi-
cation away from a century of overwhelmingly subjective judgement and categorical conclu-
sions. (The absolutist nature of fingerprint expert opinions is largely attributable to the imper-
atives of legal advocacy overpowering the imperatives of science.) It also directly confronts 
complexities in fingerprint observation and measurement that are glossed over in conventional 
forensic analysis: intraprint and intramark variation, variation between examiners, difficulty 
of harnessing available databases, quantification of the weight of the evidence, and so on. 
Other laudable aspects of the work include making explicit the authors’ assumptions and ac-
knowledging the complexity of the problems of scientific forensic identification. 
 
Implications for the future 
 
Most obviously, the approach of Neumann and his colleagues allows the fiction of absolute 
identification to give way and the results of fingerprint examinations to be expressed in prob-
abilistic terms. The precise expression remains to be worked out, and the implications (if any) 
for the trial process need to unfold. Examiners who previously refrained from testifying be-
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cause they felt less than 100% certain of identification can testify more often. Jurors might per-
ceive reasonable doubt despite a fingerprint identification. The question arises, then, about 
how probabilistic forensic identification evidence will interact with other evidence in a case. 
The new paradigm calls on us to consider potential difficulties surrounding implementa-
tion. Suppose that a cost-benefit analysis compared the computer-aided, quantified approach 
with the conventional approach and found higher costs but otherwise no differences. Is the 
justice system willing to pay more for something solely because it more closely approximates 
truth? 
Even if the method of Neumann and his colleagues did not become the approach of choice 
in routine casework, it could nevertheless be used in research that would help to set lower and 
upper bounds on the weight of evidence, given certain facts about the print and mark under 
examination. That would permit experts to testify to weight-of-evidence within certain calcu-
lated bounds. 
The ultimate destination of such research on forensic identification is full computer auto-
mation, free of idiosyncratic human judgement, and potentially offering full transparency—
though susceptible to its own limitations and imperfections. 
